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Traditionally, legal scholarship on judicial review is predominantly normative, concentrating on how courts should decide cases and to what extent they should show deference towards the legislative branch. Political scientists, on the other hand, seem more interested in what motivates judges and which factors influence their decisions. In contrast to the extensive body of literature on judicial behaviour in countries with a common law tradition (especially on the US Supreme Court), there is little systematic, empirical knowledge relating to European constitutional courts.
Focusing on the Constitutional Court of Belgium, the approach of this book is to combine normative ideas on how the Court should act with an empirical case law analysis. It explores the extent to which the Court performs as a deliberative institution, while operating within a consensual political system: Does the Court employ deliberative 'judicial good practices'? Is the Court's performance affected by strategic
Focusing on the Constitutional Court of Belgium, the approach of this book is to combine normative ideas on how the Court should act with an empirical case law analysis. It explores the extent to which the Court performs as a deliberative institution, while operating within a consensual political system: Does the Court employ deliberative 'judicial good practices'? Is the Court's performance affected by strategic
